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6. Electronics Intelligence - Telemetry

In the field of ELINT, the collection and analysis of Soviet missile and space vehicle telemetry is vitally important to our assessment of Soviet Bloc capabilities, and to our national posture in the missile and space competition with the Soviet Bloc. The intelligence community already has established substantial capabilities in this field, which it is continuing to improve. Two problem areas exist in which further effort is necessary: the existence of gaps in the collection and analysis of Soviet missile and space vehicle telemetry, and the need for more complete coordination of the various efforts being applied throughout the community on telemetry collection and analysis.

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capabilities and narrow these gaps. ~~For the immediate future, it is possible that capabilities can be increased through greater use of appropriate-~~

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As a result of action taken in the Department of Defense (DOD) in implementation of Joint Study Group Recommendation No. 7, a revised DOD directive on ELINT will be issued in the near future which will increase the authority of the Director NSA in the control and coordination of ELINT activities conducted in the Department of Defense. It is expected that the implementation of this new directive will result in considerably somewhat improved control and coordination of Department of Defense activities engaged in work on Soviet telemetry.

~~The intelligence community should give the fullest support and assistance to the Director NSA in exercising his responsibilities in this field.~~

A factor which complicates the coordination of the various community efforts being applied to the analysis of Soviet missile and space vehicle telemetry is the provision in NSCID-6 which specifies that NSA not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence as distinguished from intelligence information. Channel identification has been clearly recognized as being within the purview of NSA but there has been some question as to whether simultaneous analysis of subsystems and systems (which fall in the intelligence area) are necessary for meaningful channel analysis.

Immediate supplementing of analysis capability could best be accomplished by more effectively using the many contractors now serving the various Services and Agencies. This would require that the individual capabilities of these contractors for the production of analogs, for channel identification, or for the production of intelligence be recognized and that better overall coordination and allocation of responsibilities be effected. It is recommended that the ELINT committee, calling on the Telemetry and Beacon Analysis Committee as required, review the allocation of resources for analysis and production of intelligence from telemetry analysis and make suitable recommendations to USIB.

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Additionally, CIA conducts ELINT collection and analysis activities utilizing CIA resources. These latter activities are primarily conducted to supplement and support the community effort, taking advantage of unique CIA capabilities to perform collection operations in certain areas. This being the case, it is important that they be fully coordinated with the other community efforts subject to the control of the Director NSA. To this end, arrangements exist between CIA and NSA to ensure proper coordination of these activities with other ELINT activities, and their responsiveness to the technical and operational control of the

Director NSA as appropriate. These arrangements provide necessary means to ensure that the Director NSA can effectively utilize these CIA resources to the maximum benefit of the over-all ELINT effort which he is responsible. ~~The principle should be observed that analysis of ELINT material collected by CIA in support of the community effort is the responsibility of the Director NSA.~~

Although the principle should continue to be observed that technical analysis of ELINT material collected by CIA in support of the community effort is the responsibility of the Director NSA it should be recognized that preliminary analysis for technical feedback in support of the operation is the responsibility of CIA. Exploitation of these tapes for intelligence information is now delegated to CIA by NSA, and as experience has shown the advantages of this arrangement it should be continued. The synthesis of all ELINT with other information for the production of intelligence should continue to be the responsibility of the Services and CIA.

~~A factor complicating coordination of the various community efforts being applied to the analysis of Soviet missile and space vehicle telemetry is the provision in NSC 5412-6 which specifies that NSA not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence as distinguished from intelligence information. Telemetry is sufficiently unique and different from the more conventional ELINT products as to pose a special problem in clearly separating the NSA analysis responsibilities from those of the other departments and agencies.~~

Although the total community effort is generally coordinated through the various mechanisms available for this purpose, there is no single authoritative and agreed concept or definition of the division between NSA's responsibilities and the responsibilities of the other departments and agencies in the field of telemetry analysis. As telemetry is a growing source of electronics intelligence it becomes increasingly important to arrive at a clearer understanding and definition of the responsibilities of NSA and the other departments and agencies for telemetry analysis in order to achieve improved coordination of the community's efforts in this field and more effective use of total resources. The Director NSA should investigate this problem, and make recommendations to USIB concerning the division of responsibility for telemetry analysis in the community, taking into consideration the various capabilities which exist in the field throughout the community.

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